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Images of the Muslim Woman  
and the Construction of Muslim Identity
The Essentialist Paradigm
ABSTRACT
This article argues that much of the postmodern discourse on the Muslim woman and 
her veil is symptomatic of what I call the “essentialist paradigm”. The world is seen 
through the prism of a group’s religious/cultural identity and eventually constructs a 
Muslim identity – and with it an image of the Muslim Woman. The image of the op-
pressed veiled Muslim Woman and the treatment of a piece of cloth as synonymous 
with her whole identity and being are products of this paradigm of thought. Using an 
interdisciplinary approach that combines discourse analysis and a case study of the 
construction of the British Muslim community, this article argues that the essentialist 
paradigm ignores the context of its subject matter with all its accompanying power 
structures, political and social factors, and the roles played by both the state and fun-
damentalist Islam in constructing a Muslim identity and with it the Muslim Woman and 
her dress code.
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THREE IMAGES 
First image: A woman in a burqa,1 a convert to Islam; she is the Women’s Representa-
tive of the Islamic Central Council of Switzerland. She is participating in a 2013 podium 
1 The burqa is a full-body cloak worn by some Muslim women that covers the face as well. Wearing the 
burqa is a custom imported from Najd, a region in Saudi Arabia and the power base of Salafi Islam. 
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discussion in Arena, a Swiss political talkshow, and argues that her burqa is an expres-
sion of “free choice” (fig. 1). She says that the face of a woman, unlike the face of a 
man, is a source of temptation and that was a long process for her to come to this 
realisation, but in the end she chose to follow God’s will. The core of her argument 
runs, “This is my religion and I am exercising my right to freedom of religion.”2
Second image: A poster from 2009 of 
a woman in a burqa; only the woman’s 
eyes are visible. She is positioned among 
seven minarets, designed to look like 
rockets, standing on the Swiss flag. In 
the lower part of the poster a short sen-
tence looms: “Yes to the prohibition of 
minarets” (fig. 2). 
2 Arena 2013.
Fig. 1: Screenshot from Arena, a Swiss political talk show, 28 September 2013, © Elham Manea.
Fig. 2: Campaign against the 
construction of minarets in 
Switzerland, autumn 2009 
© Daria Pezzoli-Olgiati, Neggio.
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Third image: A female protester is savagely beaten by Egyptian military forces (fig. 3). 
The woman was wearing a black abaya3 but ironically is known only as “the woman 
in the blue bra”. The clip of the “blue bra incident” on 17 December 2011 shows a 
limp woman being dragged by her arms along the street with her abaya ripped open, 
exposing her naked torso and blue bra. Military forces surround her, many wielding 
batons; guards hit her, and one stomps on her.4 
The woman in Arena is articulating Salafism, a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam 
that argues that the face of a woman is a source of temptation and should be cov-
ered to protect men and society. That position is considered extreme in the Islamic 
world(s) and is not shared by the majority of Islamic legal interpretations. Within Mus-
lim countries it is highly contested and deemed a fringe belief by many. On 2 April 
2010, for example, the Mufti of Al Azhar, the highest religious authority in Sunni Islam, 
stated in a programme on Al Arabiya TV that wearing the burqa is a “custom, not a 
religious requirement” and the product of a “lone opinion” in Islamic jurisprudence.5 
The poster, propagated by far-right and xenophobic Swiss political forces, uses the 
burqa as a visual symbol for a threat endangering Switzerland, with the image of the 
3 Abaya or cloak is a black loose over-garment, essentially a robe-like dress, worn by some women espe-
cially in the Arabian Peninusla. 
4 Coleman 2011.
5 Al Arabiya TV 2010.
Fig. 3: The “blue bra” female protester beaten by Egyptian police during clashes in Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square on 17 December 2011 © Reuters.
94 | Elham Manea www.jrfm.eu 2016, 2/1, 91–110
woman employed to represent everything that contradicts Swiss values. The clip of 
the woman in the blue bra ironically introduces the agency of a woman who took to 
the streets while covered to protest the actions of the army and hence became the 
subject of the brutal force of a police state. At the heart of all three images is the 
body of the Muslim woman, covered or stripped, as a field of religious, political, and 
ideological battle. Islamists treat her body and its mandatory coverage as a symbol 
of a strict Islamist social order imposed on all who live under their control. European 
xenophobic forces see in her  Burka a threat of Islamisation that must be stopped. The 
authoritarian Arab state uses the exposure of her body as an instrument of intimida-
tion intended to stop her from practising her political rights. 
In the three pictures there is an image, utilised to represent religion and gender; 
a woman, who defies these representations and develops a space of resistance that 
challenges the religious, authoritarian, and xenophobic symbolisation of her body; a 
context that is conspicuously absent from the narratives and representations of the 
Muslim woman in all of these images; and most significantly a constructed Muslim 
identity that encapsulates the Muslim Woman, hiding her humanity, personality, and 
diversity – this constructed image that is exploited by different actors for different 
purposes.
I look at visuality, normativity, and gender through a contextual prism within the 
indispensible concept of universality. Both normativity and visuality are shaped by 
context. In Saudi Arabia a woman walking without covering her whole body, including 
her hair and face, would stand out as both odd and foreign, and, most importantly, 
would be perceived as promiscuous and threatening to public morality. She might 
be arrested and flogged as a result. Yet, this same woman would not draw atten-
tion if she walked in the streets of Berne or Zurich, where her appearance – wearing 
jeans, skirt, or dress, and with her hair and face uncovered – are considered “normal”. 
We visualise through our prisms of meanings, concepts, and norms of acceptability. 
But these prisms tend to vary over time, for they are not immune to modification or 
change. 
Likewise, gender roles are often constructed through their social context: a wom-
an’s role in family, her treatment as a child and later as a woman, and her function 
within society are all shaped by her familial, social, religious, cultural, economic, and 
political contexts. That said, while her roles, and her worth or lack of worth, vary from 
one context to another, every woman is born with inalienable and universal value 
and rights that are irrespective of context: she is born equal in dignity and rights. The 
tension between the worth attributed to a woman by her context and her worth as 
a human being gave birth to the universal women’s rights discourse. I use the term 
“woman” here as an example for gender, which encompasses women, men, and 
transsexuals. 
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THE ESSENTIALIST PARADIGM
Remarkably, when some social scientists engage in intellectual discourse on the Mus-
lim Woman, on her body (covered or not) and on the veil (headscarf or burqa), they 
often neutralise the context as if it were of no consequence and homogenise the 
woman’s identities, seeing only her religious identity as valid, authentic, and relevant. 
They seem to see only the veil, not the person wearing the veil. They, too, have con-
structed an encapsulated image of the Muslim Woman that hides her individual hu-
manity and personality. 
Each of the political and social actors mentioned in the three images above – Is-
lamist fundamentalists, Western far-right xenophobic forces, and the authoritarian 
state – has political motives for engaging in a discourse that is both ahistorical and 
decontextualised. Similarly, such social scientists seem to be engaged in a discourse 
driven by ideology rather than context or history. They talk in terms of abstract con-
cepts such as freedom of religion and constitutional law and treat the Muslim Woman 
as an oppressed member of a minority who needs to be defended and protected from 
the vilification and demonisation of her religious identity. One established approach 
to this subject has been described by Pascale Fournier as “left legalism”, defined by 
Janet Halley and Wendy Brown as “endeavours in which the left [seeks] to mobilize 
the implicit promise of the liberal state that it will attempt to make justice happen by 
means of law”.6 Here justice means the Muslim Woman’s right to wear a veil, specifi-
cally the burqa.
Building on Fournier’s classification, this intellectual engagement with legalism and 
the discourse it generates has a number of aspirations. First, it seems to give voice 
and agency to Muslim women through freedom of religion and the defence of freely 
chosen beliefs. Natasha Bakht’s chapter entitled “Veiled Objections: Facing Public Op-
position to the Niqab” provides samples of this type of discourse. Bakht writes that 
many Muslim women literally “wear” their religious convictions for all to see,7 an idea 
echoed by Jen’nan Ghazal Read and John P. Bartkowski, who note, “These veiled re-
spondents find comfort in the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness that the veil affords 
them . . . [linking] them to the broader community (ummah) of Islamic believers and 
Muslim women”.8 The headscarf can express an active interest in Islamic scripture, 
as a gesture that reaffirms a commitment to Islamic morality and identity within a 
modern social context and must not necessarily be seen as a manifestation of passive 
submission to the Islamic community.9 For others yet, the veil is a reminder of accept-
able forms of behaviour for men and women.10 The veil can be seen, Bakht concludes, 
6 Halley and Brown, quoted in Fournier 2013, 690.
7 Bakht 2012, 81–82.
8 Read and Bartkowski, quoted in Bakht 2012, 81.
9 Göle 1996, 4; Wiles 2007, 720.
10 Yildiz Atasoy, referenced in Bakht 2012, 82.
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as a “display of faith and modesty or something more akin to a political statement 
related to emancipation from the West”.11
Secondly, this intellectual engagement combines forms of political multicultural-
ism that justify robust conceptions of religious accommodation. Bruce Ryder’s chap-
ter “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” is an example of this 
type of discourse. Arguing for greater religious accommodation Ryder contends,
The rights to positive accommodation of religious practices [in Canada] which sound so 
fine in the law books are, of course, not always easily achieved on the ground. Whatever 
their rights on paper, in a variety of social contexts religious persons have to struggle for 
comprehension, and then for recognition, and then for accommodation of their religious 
beliefs and practices. This struggle is particularly challenging for religious minorities whose 
traditions and practices are often poorly understood. Discourses of the alien, dangerous 
“other” can quickly fill the gaps left by incomprehension or ignorance.12
A third dimension of this discourse portrays the veil as synonymous with identity, and 
proposes, therefore, that proscribing the veil is a form of oppression. Natan Sharan-
sky’s book Defending Identity (2009) falls within this subcategory. Sharansky argues 
that “expressions of religious identity have very different meanings in different con-
texts. To some women, the veil is not only a religious obligation but a manifestation of 
their own culture and an expression of who they are. To deny them the right to wear 
it becomes a form of repression.”13 Hence, according to Sharansky, a law banning the 
veil (a headscarf in this case) means that Muslims are “coerced to act one way while 
thinking and feeling another”.14
Fourth, this intellectual discourse considers the whole debate about the veil (head-
scarf) to be a constructed discourse used as a pretext to impose a hegemonic secular 
and/or imperial Western agenda. Judith Butler’s article “Sexual Politics, Torture, and 
Secular Time” (2008) is an example of this type of discourse. According to Butler,
The debate on whether girls should be prohibited from wearing the veil in public schools 
seemed to bring this paradox into relief. The ideas of the secular were invoked to consoli-
date ignorant and hateful views of Islamic religious practice (i.e. the veil is nothing other 
than the communication of the idea that women are inferior to men, or the veil commu-
nicates an alliance with “fundamentalism”), at which point laïcité becomes a way not of 
negotiating or permitting cultural difference, but a way of consolidating a set of cultural 
presumptions that effect the exclusion and abjection of cultural difference.15
11 Bakht 2012, 82.
12 Ryder 2008, 88.
13 Sharansky 2009, 115.
14 Sharansky 2009, 114.
15 Butler 2008, 13.
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In my opinion, this type of intellectual discourse on the veil of the Muslim Woman is 
symptomatic of a paradigm of thought that has dominated postcolonial, postmod-
ern discourses for far too long. In my forthcoming book Women and Shari’a Law: The 
Impact of Legal Pluralism in the UK,16 I term this approach an “essentialist paradigm”, 
noting that its advocates insist on treating people as members of homogeneous 
groups, essentialising their cultures and religions, underestimating the consequences 
of their academic discourse on human rights, and discarding voices of people from 
these very cultures as “not authentic enough”.17
Four features characterise the essentialist paradigm: 
1. It combines multiculturalism as a political process with a policy of soft legal plural-
ism, dividing people along cultural, religious, and ethnic lines, treating them dif-
ferently on account of their “cultural differences” and in the process setting them 
apart and placing them in parallel legal enclaves. 
2. It perceives rights from the perspective of the group: the group has rights, not the 
individuals within it. It insists that each group has a collective identity and culture, 
an essential identity and culture, which should be protected and perpetuated even 
if doing so violates the rights of individuals within the group. 
3. It is dominated by a cultural relativist approach to rights (in both its forms, as 
strong and soft cultural relativism) and argues that rights and other social prac-
tices, values, and moral norms are culturally determined.18 
4. It is haunted by the white man’s/woman’s burden caused by a strong sense of 
shame and guilt for the Western colonial and imperial past and by a paternalistic 
desire to protect minorities or people from former colonies. 
The essentialist paradigm is a mindset that perceives the other – whether a mem-
ber of a minority group, as in this case, or an entire Third World country – as the op-
pressed and understands human rights as tools imposed by the Western oppressor. 
It considers those who fight for universal human rights in their own societies as not 
authentic representatives of their countries and in the process ignores or justifies dire 
human rights violations committed in the name of the rights of groups or cultural and 
religious rights.
I identified this paradigm of thought during my research into calls to introduce 
Islamic law in Western legal systems. Because proponents of soft legal pluralism have 
used Britain as a positive model,19 it was imperative to research the British case. I ap-
proached Islamic sharia councils and Muslim arbitration tribunals in various British 
16 Manea, forthcoming 2016.
17 The study is based on field research by the author in the United Kingdom (36 interviews conducted in 
2013) and makes use of the results of previous field research by the author in Syria, Kuwait, and Yemen 
(71 interviews between 2006 and 2008). In addition, discourse and content analyses have been used to 
deconstruct the postmodern discourse on group rights. 
18 Donnelly 1984, 401.
19 Bowen 2012; Williams 2008; Yilmaz 2005; Kemper/Reinkowski 2005.
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cities and met their leading sheiks, including the only woman on any of these panels. I 
also interviewed experts and lawyers, as well as activists in civil society and women’s 
rights groups, especially from within the Muslim communities, and also politicians 
who are calling for reform of this legal “model”.20 The more I looked into the subject, 
the clearer it became that the issue is not merely a matter of a group of scholars sup-
porting a specific legal system. Their discourse represents a paradigm of thought that 
sees the world through the prism of a group’s religious and cultural identity and thus 
constructs Muslim identity as a group identity that shapes every aspect of the lives of 
the members of this religious community, including the Muslim Woman. 
The image of the oppressed, veiled Muslim Woman and the treatment of a piece 
of cloth as synonymous with her whole identity are products of the essentialist para-
digm of thought and its fixation with group identity. From this perspective, the con-
struction of Muslim identity and the construction of the Muslim Woman are two sides 
of the same coin. As the notion of group identity and the collective rights of a group 
has proved so important, in the following section I critically discuss this notion, fo-
cusing on the ideas of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who in my opinion has 
strongly influenced the essentialist discourse.
GROUP IDENTITY AND RIGHTS
Charles Taylor, the father of legal pluralism, famously espoused group identity and 
group rights.21 His concept of a politics of recognition, introduced in the edited vol-
ume Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994), has permeated 
much of the thinking within the essentialist paradigm. He refers to the politics of mul-
ticulturalism in terms of demands for recognition of minority or subaltern groups.
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, with 
recognition often misrecognition. A person or group of people can suffer real dam-
age, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirrors a confining or de-
meaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition 
can inflict harm and can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, 
distorted, and reduced mode of being.22
Taylor tends to see identity and with it culture and society as static, as a whole that 
has inherent, given traits. For Taylor, identity is “who we are, where we are coming 
from, and thus the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and 
aspirations make sense”.23 In his paradigm, identity does not exist in a vacuum. It is 
very much intertwined with “authenticity”, as he terms it: “There is a certain way of 
being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way and not in imi-
20 Manea, forthcoming 2016.
21 This section is based on Manea, forthcoming 2016, chapters 2–3.
22 Taylor 1994, 25, emphasis in the original.
23 Taylor 1994, 30.
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tation of anyone else’s life”.24 This “notion gives importance to being true to myself. If 
I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me.”25 This notion 
of authentic identity has given rise to what Taylor calls the “politics of difference”, in 
which distinctions are the basis of differential treatment: “The aim is to cherish dis-
tinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we are concerned with identity, then 
what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it never be lost?”26 Cherishing dis-
tinctions requires introducing policies involving “collective goals” designed for “cul-
tural survival”.27 Taylor insists that a society with strong collective goals can still be 
liberal if it is “also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those 
who do not share its common goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards 
for fundamental rights”.28 Fundamental rights aside, Taylor considers it quite possible 
that the rights of individuals will be restricted if the state focuses on safeguarding its 
collective goals; he also acknowledges that the pursuit of the collective end will prob-
ably involve treating insiders and outsiders differently. 
Taylor’s concept of identity is not concerned with identity at the individual level. 
He focuses on the collective identity of a cultural group. This cultural group may be 
aboriginal bands or French Canadians, especially Quebeckers. It could also be a group 
designated by its gender, for example women. It could be a religious group, like the 
Muslims. His main motivation in describing the politics of recognition and hence dif-
ference is fear of “imposing” a hegemonic culture on the culture of a minority. His 
aim is to protect minority rights. From this perspective his aim is certainly noble. The 
problem lies in Taylor’s attempt to ensure that the collective identity of a cultural 
group can survive. Here he falls into an essentialist trap: focusing on the authentic 
identity of a cultural group assumes that it has fundamental, unchangeable traits. 
This assumption ignores the fact that cultures do change, that they are not static. 
What we considered to be part of our cultural norms and identity yesterday may look 
quite abhorrent today. In addition, minority groups are not homogenous, as Taylor as-
sumes. They do not represent one cultural block with similar, standardised features. 
Often members of minority groups have a complex set of identities that they express 
differently in different settings. Taylor also ignores the power structures within minor-
ity groups, which further complicate matters, especially when some members claim 
to be representatives of a cultural group and assume the right to define what this 
group’s authentic identity is, and what it is not. 
Taylor tries to protect certain rights for particular groups, but his efforts create 
a mess. When we propagate the concept of a group’s rights, we also justify the vio-
lation of human rights within minority groups as an expression of different cultural 
24 Taylor 1994, 30.
25 Taylor 1994, 33, emphasis in the original.
26 Taylor 1994, 40.
27 Taylor 1994, 61.
28 Taylor 1994, 61.
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concepts of rights and justice. Women’s rights have been violated with impunity on 
these very grounds.
Let me explain. Culture does change. Consider the fact that between 1877 and the 
mid-1960s, the Jim Crow caste system was quite acceptable in the South in the United 
States. The system treated blacks as a degenerate caste and second-class citizens; 
it excluded them from public transport and public facilities, from serving on juries 
and from entering certain jobs and neighbourhoods. And it severely regulated social 
interactions between the races. During that period it was quite normal to have sepa-
rate hospitals, prisons, schools, churches, cemeteries, and public accommodations 
for blacks and whites. These laws and policies were sustained by a whole range of 
religious, educational, and “scientific” discourses. A mainstream Christian interpre-
tation at the time taught that “whites were the Chosen people, blacks were cursed 
to be servants, and God supported racial segregation”.29 At every educational level, 
scientists (craniologists, eugenicists, phrenologists and social Darwinists) bolstered 
the belief that blacks were innately inferior to whites, intellectually and culturally. The 
media did their share by routinely referring to blacks as “niggers, coons, and darkies”, 
and by reinforcing “anti-black stereotypes”.30 At the time both blacks and whites 
were governed by cultural norms on how they should interact. For instance, a black 
male could not offer his hand to a white male, as such a gesture implied social equal-
ity. Under no circumstance was a black male to offer to light the cigarette of a white 
woman, an act that implied an intimacy that might be punished by lynching.31
Fifty years ago, that culture of racial discrimination was acceptable in parts of 
the United States. Many white people considered the Jim Crow caste system to be, 
in Taylor’s words, “who we are, where we are coming from”; as such, it was “the 
background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make 
sense”.32 When others began to demand changes in these laws – and thus in this ele-
ment of the way of life in the South – white people perceived these demands as tanta-
mount to imposing an “imitation of anyone else’s life” and corrupting a “certain way 
of being human that is my way”.33
I know I am being provocative here. But if we are to take Taylor’s argument about 
authenticity, identity, and culture at face value, white people in the Southern states 
were, and perhaps still are, born racist. That was the “way they are”. Racism and a 
belief in their superiority over blacks was “inherent in the way they give meaning 
to their lives” and as such we should cherish their “distinctness, not just now but 
forever”. After all, “that was their culture”.34 Does this mean we should aspire to 
29 Pilgrim 2014.
30 Pilgrim 2014.
31 Pilgrim 2014.
32 Taylor 1994, 30.
33 Taylor 1994, 30.
34 Taylor 1994, 30.
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the survival of racism and white supremacy? How horrible would this argument have 
sounded? But this expectation is hardly true, right? People are not born racists. They 
are made racists. They are made racists by a whole range of institutions, including 
religion, science, the media, and education. These institutions and their discourses 
supported and maintained the Jim Crow system of racial discrimination. I mentioned 
these institutions deliberately, because cultures do not function in a void. They may 
be sustained or altered depending on the contexts in which they are operating and 
the systems that maintain them. Therefore, it was no coincidence that once men and 
women, black and white, from the South as well as the North, started to tackle and 
oppose the intellectual foundations of discrimination, the culture of the caste system 
began to fall apart and with it the norms that sustained it.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MUSLIM IDENTITY:  
THE BRITISH CASE 
What holds true for the “hegemonic” culture applies also to the “minority” culture: 
neither functions in a void or remains unchanged.35 Each can be sustained or altered 
by the context it is operating within and the systems that maintain it. This idea is 
evident in my research as I show how and why perceptions of Pakistani and Bangla-
deshi communities in the United Kingdom changed. From the 1950s to the 1970s their 
members were seen as representatives of diverse South Asian nations, but since the 
1980s they have been perceived as faceless members of the Muslim community.36 
Moreover, a minority group is not homogenous. It does not represent one cultural 
block with similar and standardised features and traits. Diversity within a minority 
group is expressed in different forms, on an individual level as well as the group level. 
Consider the example of a young woman I met in London in January 2013 during 
a meeting with members of a small LGBT Muslim support group called Imaan, which 
means “faith” in Arabic.37 I will call her Leila. She is British, of South Asian heritage, 
an atheist and a lesbian. Leila wears a headscarf because of community pressure in 
her neighbourhood in Birmingham. She does not want to wear it, but she lives in a 
closed community where breaking the imposed rules would bring harm to her and 
her family; hence, wearing the headscarf allows her to sidestep that risk. However, 
wearing the headscarf immediately puts her into a religious box. Her appearance as a 
woman with a headscarf transforms her from a woman into a Muslim Woman, and a 
Muslim Woman is usually a religious person. But Leila is an atheist. The larger society 
35 This part is based on Manea, forthcoming 2016: chapter 2.
36 Manea, forthcoming 2016.
37 Imaan supports the efforts of LGBT Muslim people and their families and friends to address questions 
of sexual orientation within Islam. It provides a safe space and support network where people can deal 
with issues of common concern through sharing individual experiences and institutional resources. For 
more information see their website, http://www.imaan.org.uk/about/about.htm.
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is unable to see this part of her. If she wears the veil, then she must be a believer. It 
goes without saying that her belief, or rather her lack thereof, is a secret she keeps to 
herself within her community. On top of that, she is a lesbian. Her sexual orientation is 
another secret that she has to guard, lest it become known and cause a scandal with 
dire consequences. Leila does not fit within any of the cultural or ethnic categories to 
which she might automatically be assigned, neither within her community, which im-
poses its values on its members, nor within the larger society, which sees her in terms 
of a garment that covers her hair. She is a complex person with various identities, yet 
all we see as we look at her is a religious identity that she does not believe in. On an 
individual level, then, an ethnic or a religious category often cannot describe a person 
for two reasons: (1) each person has various identities, and (2) being associated with 
a religious group does not automatically make one religious or part of that group. 
Moreover, on a group level, a minority is not homogenous. Consider the Muslim 
community (singular) in Britain. In the 1960s its members formed what were termed 
“South Asian communities” (plural). They included waves of migrants from Pakistan, 
India, and Bangladesh. Within these national groupings, they were still seen as di-
verse, with different religious denominations and linguistic, regional, and ethnic 
backgrounds. At that time, as many interviewees told me, one would have been hard 
pressed to find a woman wearing a veil, let alone a burqa. The members of these 
communities identified themselves by their nationalities and sometimes by region-
al origins, such as being from Mirpur, a district and one of the largest cities in Paki-
stan’s Kashmir region. They may have practised their religion, but doing so did not 
frame their interaction with the world. It was not the mantle in which they wrapped 
themselves. Their religion was not the identity they stressed. From the 1970s, an intel-
lectual shift took place, paving the way for the construction of the Muslim identity 
(singular).38 
On one hand, as Kenan Malik, a left-leaning Indian-born English thinker, notes, the 
left helped to introduce the politics of difference and group rights. The old radical 
left, Malik tells us, slowly lost its faith in secular universalism and Enlightenment ideas 
of rationalism and humanism and instead began talking about multiculturalism and 
group rights, decrying these Enlightenment ideas as “Eurocentric”, part of the Euro-
American project imposed on other people. For decades, the left had argued that eve-
ryone should be equal whatever their racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural differences; 
now the left pushed the idea that different people should be treated differently pre-
cisely because of such differences.39
On the other hand, the British state played a crucial part in translating this ideologi-
cal shift into reality, by introducing multicultural policies at the local and national lev-
els. Urban riots and unrest during the 1970s and 1980s raised concerns about how to 
38 This part is adapted from Manea, forthcoming 2016, chapter 3.
39 Malik 2009, xix; Malik 2013, 19.
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engage “ethnic minority communities” in the political process. The deliberations led 
to the sanctioning of a multiracial, multicultural approach that recognised different 
ethnic communities and needs in society. 
What followed were policies that emphasised the importance of “different cultur-
al backgrounds in determining people’s identity” and the necessity to “engage with 
community groups on this basis”.40 A shift was occurring in the public space, moving 
away from the “liberal tradition of dealing with people in a ‘colour-blind’ way” and to-
wards “differential treatment according to their cultural identities”.41 Equality would 
now require cultural recognition and respect. For “a person’s culture” not to be “af-
firmed and given status” would be “considered to be a denial of equality”.42 The ideas 
of Charles Taylor had found their home in the British policies of difference. 
Gradually, local and national authorities adopted and moulded a range of services 
to accommodate the supposedly different needs of citizens and clients all across soci-
ety. Over time, the nation has established ethnic housing associations and healthcare, 
arts and cultural along with voluntary support, radio channels, public broadcasting, 
and policing units, all based on ethnicity.43 Ethnic and cultural groups were encour-
aged to make demands based on their differences and cultural exclusion from the 
mainstream. Their ability to access resources from the public purse was often de-
pendent on their being unfairly disadvantaged because of their “difference”. Slowly 
but steadily, over the decades, ethnically and culturally specific lobbying groups have 
emerged, “each arguing their own corner for more money, resources and support for 
their particular identity”.44
As some of my interviewees recounted, the outcome has been the demarcation of 
people into visible cultural and religious “communities” headed by state-picked com-
munity “leaders”. The communities rub against and compete with each other, living 
apart, looking at each other with suspicion, if not hatred.
In fact, Britain inaugurated a multicultural policy that in reality imposed a religious 
identity on communities (plural) and inadvertently facilitated the creation of a Muslim 
community (singular): an invented community, not an imagined one, to use Benedict 
Anderson’s term.45 As a government creation, this invented community did not to 
celebrate diversity within a British context; instead, a group of loud Islamists was el-
evated as community leaders. They did not represent the majority within their com-
munities. Several people I interviewed, people knowledgeable about political Islam 
and extremism in Britain, emphasised this point. The community did not choose these 
so-called leaders, nor did the leaders, at the time, enjoy the support of the members. 
40 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 23.
41 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 23.
42 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 24.
43 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 24.
44 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 24.
45 Anderson 1991.
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Their demands represented their own political agenda, which was to spread their vi-
sion of political Islam, but by elevating these individuals to the status of leaders, the 
government placed them in a position to dictate what their group’s cultural and reli-
gious needs were. They were the gatekeepers of the “Muslim minority”. 
Consider this example. Up until the London terrorist attacks in 2005, the British 
government treated the Muslim Council of Britain, an umbrella organisation, as the 
sole representative of the Muslim community. The Muslim Council of Britain was 
founded and controlled by members of an Islamist group, Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI). Cre-
ated in 1941 by Abu al-Alaa al-Mawdudi, an Indian-born journalist who later moved 
to Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami became an indispensable part of the worldwide Islamist 
movement, comparable to the Muslim Brotherhood. Mawdudi and with him Jamaat-
e-Islami set themselves the immediate aim of restoring a state which would apply 
sharia. Sovereignty accordingly does not belong to the people but to Allah alone and 
power is only legitimate if it is used according to the commands of God.46 
According to Lorenzo Divino, a leading expert on political Islam in the West, the 
UK Islamic Mission, established in 1962 and headquartered in in the north London 
borough of Islington, was the embryo of the Mawdudist network in Britain. The mis-
sion defined itself as an “ideological organisation” grounded in the belief that “Islam 
is a comprehensive way of life which must be translated into actions in all spheres of 
human life”.47 Its official mission statement recorded that the organisation sought 
to “establish the social orders of Islam for the Muslims and non-Muslims living in 
Britain”.48 
Starting from the 1970s, the UK Islamic Mission created a network of mosques. 
Concurrently, another Jamaat-e-Islami inspired organisation, the Islamic Foundation, 
became the main publisher of Mawdudist literature and later ensured that Mawdudi’s 
books became standard readings on Islam in British schools. The Mawdudists’ ulti-
mate “political coup”, to use Innes Bowen’s expression, was its control of the Muslim 
Council of Britain, created in 1997 and recognised by the British government as the 
sole representative body of Muslims in the United Kingdom.49 Not surprisingly, as a 
report of Policy Exchange (a  British centre-right think tank) report on British Muslims 
stated, British government policies of engagement with Muslims made things worse: 
“By treating Muslims as a homogenous group, the Government fails to see the diver-
sity of opinions amongst Muslims, so that they feel more ignored and excluded.”50 
Indeed, a 2007 survey of British Muslims has revealed how misguided these policies 
were. When asked to name an organisation that represented their views as a Muslim, 
only 6 per cent named the Muslim Council of Britain, while 51 per cent felt that no 
46 Kepel 1997, 92; Bowen 2014, 58–59; 75; 80–81.
47 Divino 2010, 116.
48 Divino 2010, 116.
49 Bowen 2014, 84–90; Kepel 1997, 109–111; 118–125.
50 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 6.
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Muslim organisation represented their views, and 75 per cent held that there was 
more diversity and disagreement within the Muslim population than other people re-
alised.51
Yet by then the money, resources, and support these Islamist organisations had 
received from the British government, in addition to those flowing from the Gulf 
States, had helped them create a plethora of educational, religious, and charitable 
institutions. They had the tools to spread their own vision of political Islam among 
the members of their communities. Most importantly, they helped create what I call 
“closed communities”, like the one in which Leila lives, patriarchal power structures 
that exercise social control over their members and intimidate those who reject their 
designated social rules. Leila wears a veil not because she wants to, but because she 
has to. She does not dare to come out as either a lesbian or an atheist because she 
knows that she will be made to pay dearly for such an act of rebellion against the way 
a proper Muslim woman is supposed to behave. 
I am quite certain that Taylor did not know where his ideas would take him. He said 
it was possible that the rights of individuals would be restricted by the state’s aim of 
safeguarding collective goals, but he did not expect that people would either invent 
a community or violate its members’ fundamental human rights. Sadly, this is exactly 
the outcome of his theoretical approach, which ignores the political and social con-
texts of what it describes and therefore fails to take account of the mechanisms and 
institutions that either sustain or alter an identity and its cultural traits. 
TIME FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT 
Context matters! Context matters in highlighting how a single Muslim identity has 
been constructed. It is context that shows how complex and diverse Leila’s identity 
is, and why she wears a headscarf even though she is an atheist. Yet the essentialist 
paradigm seems to ignore this very context with all its accompanying power and pa-
triarchal structures, political and social factors, and roles played by both the state and 
fundamentalist Islam in constructing a homogeneous Muslim identity and with it the 
Muslim Woman and her dress code. 
The diversity of reasons why women wear the veil does not negate nor eliminate 
the essential role played by fundamentalist Islam – defined here as a “political move-
ment of the extreme right, which manipulates religion in order to achieve its political 
aims”52 – in mainstreaming the idea that the veil is part of Islamic religious identity and 
in constructing the Muslim Woman and her obligation and/or right to wear the veil, 
as we only started to hear in the late 1970s. In countries where Islamists are in power, 
the veil is imposed by force, regardless of whether the woman wants to wear it. This 
51 Mirza/Senthikumaran/Ja’far 2007, 6.
52 Marieme Hèlie-Lucas’s definition, quoted in Bennoune 2013, 14.
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is the case in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the areas controlled by Islamists in Iraq, 
Syria, and Nigeria; the list goes on. Those who defy Islamists’ dress code are subject 
to punishment that may include flogging, imprisonment, or fines. 
In countries where Islamists are not in power – Islamic countries or Western so-
cieties with a Muslim minority – the veil is portrayed as both a religious obligation 
and part of freedom of choice. This strategy is well suited to Islamic fundamental-
ism’s worldview, well described by Karima Bennoune. First, Bennoune argues, this 
worldview seeks the imposition of “God’s Law”, that is an interpretation of sharia, on 
Muslims everywhere. Secondly, it wants to create what Islamic fundamentalists deem 
to be Islamic states or diasporic communities ruled by these laws. Thirdly, Islamic fun-
damentalism wants to police, judge, and change the behaviour, appearance, and con-
duct of other people of Muslim heritage. Fourthly, it tends to limit women’s rights 
sharply, couching its constraints in the soothing language of protection, respect, and 
difference.53
Control of women and their social behaviour and the imposition of a dress code are 
all part of fundamentalism’s worldview. That fundamentalist worldview is clearly ar-
ticulated in the literature of all major Islamist ideologists, as Lamia Rustum Shehadeh 
highlighted in her book The Idea of Women in Fundamentalist Islam (2007). Shehadeh 
examined the discourse on the Muslim Woman in the writings of the most influential 
Islamist ideologists such as Hasan al-Banna, Abu al-Alaa al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and came to the conclusion that despite their differenc-
es, they “all agreed on their image of the ideal Muslim woman and her role in society; 
[and] all followed an interventionist policy on women’s issues and family matters ir-
respective of the needs or the opinions of women themselves”.54 
In other words, the ideal Muslim woman is part of the Islamist political project. The 
veil is intrinsic to this project. In Iran, for example, a member of the Iranian National 
Assembly bluntly explained to Shehadeh that the imposition of the hijab (veil) is politi-
cal, noting, “The hijab is not being discussed as a religious issue, but as a political, so-
cial, and economic issue.”55 Shehadeh comes to the conclusion that the veiled woman 
signalled the redefinition of gender roles and the transformation of Iranian society. 
An imposed redefinition, I must emphasise, as any woman who chooses not to veil is 
subject to a penalty of seventy-four lashes without trial.56 So much for the religious 
freedom hailed by the essentialists.
Oddly, precisely the very context is often ignored by essentialists who instead 
choose to focus on an intellectual debate separate from reality. I find it interesting 
that in their writings on the Muslim Woman and her right to veil, the role played by 
fundamentalist Islam, whether or not from a position of political power, seems to be 
53 Bennoune 2013, 14–19.
54 Shehadeh 2007, 236.
55 Shehadeh 2007, 236.
56 Shehadeh 2007, 236.
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of no consequence. Judith Butler went so far as to say that this connection is nothing 
but a joke, stating in an interview: 
I have heard debates in France, for instance, in which public intellectuals who support the 
ban on the veil (le foulard) argue that the veil has only one meaning. Then they … proceed 
to argue that it is (a) an assertion of female subordination within Islam … (b) an affilia-
tion with Islamic fundamentalism (which is a joke, considering, for instance, the fashion in 
scarves that prevails in cosmopolitan areas such as Cairo).57
I certainly can follow the argument that the veil has different meanings and the rea-
sons why women wear it are therefore also varied. But to dismiss as a joke the argu-
ment that it is affiliated with Islamic fundamentalism is more than just perplexing, 
for there is sufficient literature, not to mention practical evidence (in areas ruled by 
Islamists: Sudan, Afghanistan, Gaza, Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc.), that testifies to Islamic 
fundamentalism’s imposition of the veil as a marker of separation and a symbol of 
a totalitarian Islamist type of governance.58 It also makes light of all the efforts and 
sacrifices of women and men who fight Islamic fundamentalism in Islamic and West-
ern societies. Women like Arwa Abdo Othman, whom I met while carrying out field 
research in Yemen in 2007. Arwa Abdo Othman, who is today the Yemeni Minister of 
Culture, is known for her lifelong mission to document how bright and joyful Yemeni’s 
women clothes and folklore were, and how Yemini women used to show their faces 
and the contours of their body through their traditional colourful garments. It is her 
mission to resist the onslaught of Salafi Islam, which forced its way into Yemeni soci-
ety and changed both the colour and type of clothes wore by women. In rural areas 
where women traditionally showed their faces and wore colourful garments, today 
women have to wear the Salafi niqab. Black is today’s colour. Arwa Othman has never 
lived outside her country, speaks only Arabic, and comes from a conservative family 
background. It would be hard to accuse her of being Westernised. 
During the first civil war that raged in Iraq after the U.S. invasion, Jamaat al Tawhid 
wa’l Jihad, an armed Islamist group, kidnapped and executed Zeena, a women’s 
rights activist and businesswoman who defied their dress code: “Her body was found 
wrapped in the traditional abaya, which she had refused to wear when she was alive. 
Pinned to the abaya was a message: ‘She was a collaborator against Islam.’”59 Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws documented Zeena’s case on its website in order to high-
light a fundamentalist pattern found worldwide: the use of violence against women 
as a form of political intimidation. Imposing a dress code is part of this intimidation 
strategy.60 Women Living Under Muslim Laws is run by a diverse group of women 
scholars and activists of Islamic heritage and is known for its critical views on Ameri-
57 Butler 2006.
58 See for instance Bennoune 2007; Howland 2001; Imam /Morgany/Yuval-Davis 2004.
59  Hélie 2005.
60  Hélie 2005.
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can foreign policy and the invasion of Iraq. It would be hard to sustain a claim that 
they are working on behalf of an imperial hegemonic Western agenda. And in Britain, 
a women’s rights activist with South Asian roots confided to me during my field re-
search in 2013 that in order for her to be able to work in certain closed communities in 
East London where forms of extremism are widespread and to have access to women 
living there, she has to wear the headscarf. Nothing in these examples seems at all 
funny. 
In my opinion, these essentialists are the modern embodiment of those nine-
teenth-century orientalists who believed in a civilising mission that would emancipate 
the Muslim woman. Both groups see in this woman only her religious identity. Both 
consider her a religious entity that is part of another religious whole – the Muslims. 
Both deem her to be oppressed, by xenophobic society/the imperial West or by male 
Muslims respectively. Both think she needs protection and must be freed – the es-
sentialists insist on her wearing the veil, and the orientalists want to take off her veil. 
Finally, both assume that they know best what this woman needs and who should 
speak on her behalf – no one but they themselves! 
Context matters because it shows that the essentialist discourse on the Muslim 
woman and her veil is a construct crafted in isolation from historical, political, social, 
and religious contexts. That construct mirrors the essentialists’ self-obsessed and 
self-centred image, assumptions, expectations, and ideological battles. Given the rise 
of a counter-narrative and contextual knowledge produced by female scholars of Is-
lamic heritage, it is clear that the time is ripe for a paradigm shift.
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